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credit rationing. The model explains some patterns of loan pricing and defaults, as well as of firm 
selection by types of lenders, which are consistent with the received empirical evidence. 
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Abstract
This paper analyzes the e¤ects of informational asymmetries on screening bor-
rowers. Lenders with access to accurate credit scores o¤er the most valuable bor-
rowers lower interest rates than lenders with an advantage in costly screening. This
cream-skimming induces a negative externality, which reduces the value of investing in
screening. This distortion translates into excessive lending with credit scores, too little
screening, higher default rates than optimal and credit rationing. The model explains
some patterns of loan pricing and defaults, as well as of rm selection by types of
lenders, which are consistent with the received empirical evidence.
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1 Introduction
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) play an essential role in the U.S. economy, account-
ing for around half of its employment and more than half of its output, and bank lending
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constitutes the most important source of their nancing (Bitler, Robb and Wolken, 2001;
Mach and Wolken, 2006). Small business lending has historically been a local activity, with
community banks gathering "soft" information to assess rmscreditworthiness (Petersen
and Rajan, 1994; Frame and White, 2004).1 However, over the past two decades, a growing
number of banks have incorporated credit-score models in their small business lending oper-
ations (Akhavein, Frame and White, 2005; Berger, Cowan and Frame, 2011).2 The evolution
of credit markets towards an increased use of credit scores has fostered a wave of empirical
research that has raised a number of concerns about the soundness of lending practices, and
the availability and price of credit to small businesses.3
This paper provides a theoretical framework to address these concerns. I consider a
competitive market with two types of nanciers. Credit-score lenders have access to a credit-
score technology that enables them to make estimates of borrowersdefault likelihoods at a
negligible per-loan cost.4 Hands-on lenders observe less accurate public credit scores about
rms,5 but can invest costly resources in screening projects for which funds are being sought,
which yields better estimates of borrowers creditworthiness than credit scores.6
1Soft information comprises aspects that are hard to reduce to a number, such as the ability of a manager,
or the way she reacts under pressure (Petersen, 1994). It also includes the bank o¢ cers own assessments of
"prospects garnered from past communications with [rm]s suppliers, customers, or neighboring businesses."
(Berger and Udell, 2006).
2Credit scoring is a method of assigning a numerical value to the credit risk of a potential borrower, based
on objective data about the rm and its owner (Feldman, 1997).
3Berger, Kashyap, Scalise, Gertler and Friedman (1995) constitutes an early discussion of the potential
e¤ects of the technological advances in the U.S. banking industry. Frame, Srinivasan and Woosley (2001)
study the e¤ect of credit-scoring in the availability of credit to small businesses. DeYoung, Hunter and
Udell (2004) assess the e¤ects of technological advances, among other factors, on community bankslending
practices. Berger, Frame and Miller (2005) analyze the impact of credit scoring on the loan rates and
availability of credit for small businesses, as well as on the risk of credit-score loans. DeYoung, Glennon and
Nigro (2008) analyze the impact of credit-scores lending on loan performance rates.
4One of the main benets of credit scoring is that it dramatically reduces the processing times and the
labor inputs required (Frame, Srinivasan and Woosley, 2001). For instance, the average small business loan
processing time at Barnett Bank decreased from three or four weeks to a few hours after credit scoring was
implemented (Mester, 1997). Berger, Cowan, and Frame, (2011) write: "The primary motive for these
banks is likely reduced underwriting costs. This method may exacerbate informational opacity problems,
yield less accurate credit terms, and result in greater future credit losses, but may nevertheless be protable
because of the lower costs".
5Berger, Cowan and Frame (2011) show that, in 2005, half of the small community banks were using some
form of credit scoring in their lending to small businesses, and that they had been using it for a number
of years. They also nd that 86% of those banks only use Consumer Credit Scores (CCS) for the principal
owner of the rm, which they acquire from external vendors. On the contrary, large nancial institutions use
Small Business Credit Scores (SBCS), which provide more accurate estimates than generic scores acquired
from vendors (Mester, 1997; Berger, Cowan and Frame, 2011). Their study also shows that community
banks do not typically use credit scores for automatic loan approvals, but to complement the information
gathered through the interaction with the borrower. The next section provides a detailed description of the
use of credit scores in the industry.
6As an illustration of the interaction between a potential borrower and a loan o¢ cer at a bank branch,
Hauswald and Agarwal (2010) write: "The application process typically takes four hours to a day to com-
plete from the initial contact between rm and bank. During the branch visit, the managerowner or rm
representative supplies all the relevant data, submits nancial and tax information, provides a list of assets,
etc., which the local loan o¢ cer transcribes [...] Concurrently, the loan o¢ cer conducts an in-depth interview
with the applicant and gathers soft information in the sense that it would be hard to verify by a third party.
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I begin by studying the constrained e¢ cient allocation, as the problem of a Planner that
has access to the same information as the lenders in the economy. The Planner is confronted
with a simple trade-o¤. Screening creates value through a reduction of the expected losses
induced by potential nonperforming loans. But screenig projects entails a cost. Credit scores
complement hands-on lending, improving the e¢ ciency of lendersdecisions in confronting
this trade-o¤. For rms of high quality, as evidenced by their score, the ex-ante likelihood
of a nonperforming loan is small. Therefore, the cost exceeds the expected gain of screening
a project. Hence, credit-score loans are more e¢ cient than hands-on loans for rms with
high scores. On the contrary, hands-on loans increase the value of lending to rms with
intermediate scores. For these rms, the expected losses arising from potentially failing
loans exceed the cost of inquiring about the rmsprojects.
In a decentralized market, rms with the highest qualitythose for which credit-score
loans are more e¢ cientobtain credit from credit-score lenders. However, among the rms
for which hands-on loans are more e¢ cient, credit-score lenders exploit their ex-ante infor-
mational advantage to poach those with the highest quality from any pool of potential bor-
rowers which are observationally equivalent for the hands-on lender. This cream-skimming
induces a negative externality, whereby the expected quality of potential hands-on borrowers
is lowered. Hence, the presence of credit-score lenders reduces the value of screening. The
distortion induced by credit-score lenders leads to an underprovision of hands-on loans, as
compared to the social optimum. Moreover, the reduction in the value of hands-on lending
has two direct implications on pricing and availability of credit. First, the loan rates that
hands-on lenders charge are higher than those that would be o¤ered to observationally equiv-
alent borrowers in the absence of credit-score lenders. Second, the amount of creditworthy
projects that are deprived from credit enlarges in the presence of credit-score lenders.
This paper explains some observed regularities on the pricing and relative performance
of di¤erent types of loans. First, the model predicts that hands-on lenders charge lower
interest rates than credit-score lenders to rms of similar quality, a fact that has pointed out
in Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and Udell (1995), Degryse and van Cayseele (2000)
and Berger, Frame and Miller (2005). In this paper, credit-score lenders can exploit their
ex-ante informational advantage to capture the highest quality rms. Nonetheless, rms
of intermediate quality, those for which hands-on loans are more e¢ cient than credit-score
loans, can benet from the higher e¢ ciency of hands-on loans and obtain loans from hands-on
lenders at lower rates than rms of similar quality do from credit-score lenders.
The model also predicts that, conditional on the quality of rms, hands-on loans rates
exhibit higher dispersion than those of credit-score loans. This pricing pattern is explained
by the fact that credit-score lenderscredit decisions are exclusively based on rmsscores,
which are highly correlated with their quality. Cerqueiro, Degryse and Ongena (2011) provide
empirical support for this nding. They attribute it to the use of "discretion" in the loan
rate setting process by loan o¢ cers, as opposed to the "rules" associated to an automated
pricing model.
Notwithstanding the fact that hands-on lenders charge lower rates to rms with similar
quality, the (unconditional) average rate of hands-on loans may be higher than that of credit-
In about 8% of the cases, the branch o¢ cer will invite the applicant back to follow up on open questions,
review discrepancies in submitted information with credit reports, discuss the prospects of the rm, etc...".
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score loans. In this model, high quality rms obtain credit from credit-score lenders, a fact
that has been put forward by Petersen and Rajan (2002). Moreover, they obtain loans at
lower rates than do rms of worse quality. Hence, if the proportion of high quality rms is
high enough, the average price of credit-score loans will be lower. In line with this argument,
Martinez-Peria and Modys (2004) study of foreign banks in Latin America suggests that
foreign banks issue hands-o¤ loans at lower rates than domestic hands-on-oriented loans
because they serve a segment of rms of higher quality. This nding was put forward in an
earlier study of lending in the US by Calomiris and Carey (1994), who nd that the average
rm that borrows from foreign banks has a higher rating and obtains loans at a lower rate
than the average borrower of a domestic bank.
The presence of credit-score lenders with access to better ex-ante information forces
hands-on lenders to base all its lending decisions on soft information. Otherwise, they would
su¤er from a winners curse.7 Credit-score lenders rely on a technology that estimates the
likelihood of nonperforming loans at a lower cost than that of hands-on lenders, but that
yields less accurate assessments. Consequently, credit-score loans display higher rates of
default. Frame and Miller (2005) and DeYoung, Glennon and Nigro (2008) provide an
empirical counterpart for this result.
Although the model is general enough to accommodate di¤erent lending modes, it is
particularly suited to analyzing loans to small business. One of the main di¤erences be-
tween large corporations and small rms is that the latter are generally more informationally
opaque. For instance, small business do not typically have professionally audited nancial
statements or public ratings, which facilitate the access to di¤erent forms of borrowing. Also,
small businesses di¤er from consumers in their heterogeneity. Berger and Udell (1996) argue
that the technology of small businesses lending is essentially di¤erent from consumer lending
in that consumers demand relatively generic nancial services.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section describes the
institutional framework and discuses the use of credit scoring in the industry. Section 3
lays out the main assumptions of the model. In section 4, I characterize the constrained
e¢ cient allocation of loans as the solution to the problem of a Planner. This allocation
serves as a benchmark in the welfare analysis. In section 5, I characterize the decentralized
equilibrium of an economy with hands-on and credit-score lenders. In section 6, I compare
the decentralized and the constrained e¢ cient allocations to show the ine¢ ciency of the
market equilibrium. In section 7, I outline several testable predictions of the model and
discuss them on the light of the empirical evidence. The last section concludes. All the
proofs are contained in the appendix.
2 Institutional framework
Although there is a long-standing tradition in the use of credit scores in the assessment of
consumerscreditworthiness, the adoption of Small Business Credit Scoring (SBCS) did not
7This nding is evidenced by the fact that relationship lenders do not use scores to automatically accept
potential borrowers, but rely on soft information in their credit decisions (Berger, Cowan, and Frame, 2011;
Uchida, Udell and Yamori, forthcoming).
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take place until the early nineties (Mester, 1997)8. One of the main reasons for the relative
delay in its implementation is the lack of reliable data on loan origination, coupled with
concerns about small rms heterogeneity.
The rst small business credit scores were implemented by large national banks. The size
of these institutions allows them to develop credit-score models particularly suited for their
operations. Only in the mid nineties, Fair Isaac made its Small Business Scoring Service avail-
able to mid-sized and small community banks, followed by Experian and Dun&Bradstreet in
the last years of the decade. However, several concerns have been raised among practitioners
and researchers about the reliability of credit scores from vendors. These models mostly rely
on the personal Consumer Credit Score (CCS) of the owner or manager of the rm. More-
over, they draw their inferences from a very large and heterogeneous pool of rms, which
may be too dissimilar to the particular ones faced in certain markets. Consequently, they
may not be as good predictors of delinquencies as customized models (Mester, 1997; Berger,
Cowan, and Frame, 2011).
Early research by Frame, Srinivasan and Woosley (2001) shows that the use of credit
scores by large banks has been prevalent since the mid-nineties. However, there is ample
heterogeneity in the way SBCS are incorporated in the underwriting process of large banks.
A handful of large banks usually conduct solicitation campaigns, trying to attract small
business, to which they lend based only on their credit score. For instance, Wells Fargos
portfolio of small business loans rose by about one-third in 1996 as a result of their national
solicitation campaign (Strahan and Weston, 1998). A stylized fact across banks is that the
use of SBCS lending is limited to loans below a certain amount.9
Despite their potential lack of accuracy, the main benet of SBCS is the reduction of the
cost of processing loan evaluations. Mester (1997), citing a study by the Banking Business
Board, reports that loan approval times averaged more than 12 hours (taking around 2 weeks
previously), while loan evaluations using credit scores would take less than an hour, including
the loan o¢ cerstime when the decision is not exclusively based on the outcome of the credit
score alone.
Roughly half of the small community banks use some form of credit scoring in their
lending to small businesses (Berger, Cowan and Frame, 2011). A large fraction of those use
CCS for the principal owner of the rm, purchased from external vendors. Community banks
use credit scores to complement the information obtained through the interaction with the
borrower, but do not typically grant loans solely based on the information provided by the
scores.
It has been argued that small banks may have a comparative advantage in the provision
of hands-on loans. Large institutions may benet from economies of scale in the processing of
hard information, but be relatively bad at managing soft information, because it is di¢ cult
to reduce to numbers and communicate in large organizations (Stein, 2002). In addition,
soft information may often be proprietary to the loan o¢ cer and may not be easily observed,
veried, or transmitted to others within the nancial institution (Berger and Udell, 2006).
8Consumer credit score lending has been in place since the fties, and it is nowadays widely used in credit
card lending, auto loans and home equity loans (Berger, Cowan, and Frame, 2011).
9Berger and Frame (2007) report that large banks use SBCS for the issuance and pricing of loans below
$250,000. Mester (1997) show that there is some heterogeneity across banks. While some may use SBCS for
loans up to $1,000,000, others establish an upper threshold of $50,000.
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3 The model
3.1 Firms and projects
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of rms. Each rm has an investment
project that requires an outlay of $1. Firms are wealth constrained and therefore need to
borrow in order to perform the project. Lenders have access to funds at the universal risk-
free interest rate r  0. There are two types of projects in the economy. A good project
pays A > 1 + r with certainty, whereas bad projects pay 0. Firms can borrow funds from
lenders at a certain gross rate i 2 [1 + r; A]. Project outcomes are observable and contracts
based on outcomes can be enforced.
Firms di¤er in their ability to select and implement projects. In particular, each rm
is characterized by an intrinsic quality index  2  = [0; 1], which can be interpreted as
representing its ex-ante likelihood of carrying out a good project. Firmsquality is regarded
by lenders as a random variable ~ with density g and c.d.f. G. In order to have a well-behaved
problem, I assume:
Assumption 1: The density function g is continuous and positive everywhere in its
support , and common knowledge among all lenders.
3.2 Credit Scores
A credit score model ~x is a random variable with conditional density f (j) and c.d.f. F (j).
A credit score ~x produces a signal x about a rm, conditional on the true quality parameter
. I make the following two assumptions about this conditional distribution.
Assumption 2.1: The conditional densities f (j) are continuous everywhere in their
support X ()  R, all  2 , and common knowledge among all lenders.
Assumption 2.2: The family ff (j)g2 satises the Strict Monotone Likelihood Ratio
Property (SMLRP), i.e.:
For all x00 > x0,
f (x00j)
f (x0j) is strictly increasing in .
The SMRLP signies that high signal realizations are relatively more likely the higher
the quality of the rm. Hence, signals are informative.
In general, f (j) need not be bounded. Hence, the realizations of x may potentially lie
away from the space . For comparison purposes, it will be useful to re-scale signals, so that
they represent the expected value of the underlying quality parameter . Formally, a score
s is dened as:
s =  (x)  E
h
~jx
i
=
Z

  g^ (jx) d,
where g^ (jx) denote the posterior density of ~, conditional on x.10 The random variable ~s
induced by the transformation  () is a su¢ cient statistic for ~x. Obviously, s 2 [0; 1].
10The posterior density g^ of ~, conditional on x, is derived by Bayesrule as:
g^ (jx) = f (xj)  g ()R

f (xjt)  g (t) dt .
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3.3 Screening
3.4 Hands-on and credit-score lenders
There is a nite numberN  2 of hands-on lenders and a nite numberM  2 of credit-score
lenders. A hands-on lender can be thought of as a bank with local presence and knowledge
of the local conditions, which can interact with potential borrowers. Credit-score lenders are
nanciers that do not have this capacity. For instance, long-distance lenders, on-line lenders
or credit card issuers would fall under this category.
All lenders can observe a public noisy credit score s about the rms true quality  at
no cost.11 In addition, hands-on lenders can invest resources in screening about potential
borrowers. Soft information incorporates the subjective impressions of the bank o¢ cer about
the ownersabilities and the prospects of the project for which funds are sought. In particular,
I assume that banks can incur the cost k 2 (0; 1 + r) and observe the type of the project
(whether good or bad) for which funds are being sought.12
Credit-score lenders di¤er from hands-on lenders in two aspects. First, they cannot
acquire soft information. Second, they have access to a more accurate credit score about the
rms quality.13 For simplicity, I assume that they can observe a rms quality  without
noise at zero marginal cost. Recall that  measures the probability that a project is good.
Hence, except for the (zero-measure) cases  2 f0; 1g, a hands-on lender can always invest in
obtaining strictly better information than the credit-score lender. In the appendix, I show
that all qualitative results are robust to assuming that credit-score lenders observe a noisy
signal of the rmsqualityinstead of the true quality, as long as this signal constitutes a
su¢ cient statistic for the less accurate signal s.14
3.5 Hands-on and credit-score loans
There are two types of loans that can be granted in the economy: hands-on loans and credit-
score loans. The only distinction I make between these categories of loans is the type of
information on which the lender relies at loan origination. I refer to a "hands-on loan" as
one which originates on costly soft information. A loan that relies on hard information alone
is denoted "credit-score loan".
11The credit score s might be thought of as available from one of the credit bureaus, which relationship
lenders typically use in their credit assessments.
12This assumption is made for simplicity. All the qualitative results would hold if we assumed that
relationship lenders observed an (informative) noisy signal of the projects type.
13Berger, Cowan and Frame (2011) show that, while most large banks use Small Business Credit Scores
(SBCS), community banks mostly rely on Consumer Credit Scores (CCS) acquired from public vendors,
which provide less accurate estimates. See section 2 for further details.
14Mester (1997) reports that, in the typical development of a credit-score model, around 50 to 60 variables
are consider as predictors of delinquencies, but that only 8 to 12 end up in the nal score. Hence, we can
think of better scores as those actually pinning down more relevant variables to predict creditworthiness,
which would yield more e¢ cient estimators, in the sense of a reduced variance.
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4 Constrained e¢ ciency
In this section, I analyze the constrained e¢ cient allocation of loans as the solution to the
problem of a Planner that is only limited by the information constraints in the economy.
Hence, the Planner observes the quality  of each rm, as credit-score lenders do. In addition,
she can invest an amount k and get informed about the projects type, just as hands-on
lenders. This allocation serves as a benchmark for the welfare analysis.
A credit-score loan granted to a rm with quality  involves an opportunity cost of 1+ r
and an expected return of   A. Hence, a credit-score loan issued to a rm with quality 
generates a surplus of:
wC () =   A  (1 + r) .
screening entails a cost k. A hands-on loan is granted if and only if the project is
creditworthy. Hence, the expected prot from a hands-on loan initiated with a rm with
quality  yields a surplus of:
wR () =  k +   [A  (1 + r)] .
For each , the Planner chooses the allocation a^ () of loans that maximizes the expected
surplus, i.e.:
a^ () 2 arg max
a2fC;R;?g

wC () ; wR () ; 0
	
,
The last term captures the possibility of Planners inaction.
The following proposition characterizes the constrained e¢ cient allocation of loans.
Proposition 1 There exist credit score thresholds L  kA (1+r) , M  1+rA and H  1+r k1+r ,
and a cost threshold k  M  [A  (1 + r)], such that the constrained-e¢ cient allocation a^
of loans is given by:
If k < k:
a^ () =
8<:
No loans if  < L
Hands-on loans if L   < H
Credit-score loans if H  
.
If k  k:
a^ () =

No loans if  < M
Credit-score loans if M   .
Proof. See appendix.
Figure 1 illustrates the constrained-e¢ cient allocation of loans. The horizontal axis
displays rms quality. The surplus created by di¤erent forms of lending is represented
by solid (hands-on) or dashed (credit-score) lines.
The upper hands-on line corresponds to a low cost kL < k of screening. The thresholds
L and H are given by its intersection with the horizontal axis and the credit-score loan
surplus line, respectively. The surplus originated by hands-on loans is greater than that
created by credit-score loans if and only if   H . Moreover, for   L, the surplus created
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 
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 


 

 






 





For rms of low quality , the expected gain   [A  (1 + r)] from any loan is smaller than
the cost k of screening. Hence, it is optimal not to grant loans to rms of low quality.
Credit scores complement hands-on lending in that the score improves the e¢ ciency
of lendersdecision in confronting the trade-o¤ they face when deciding whether to invest
resources in screening. By reducing the amount of nonperforming loans, hands-on loans
increase the value of lending for rms in the range [L; H ]. Moreover, hands-on loans allow
creditworthy projects of rms in the quality range [M ; L] to be funded. Those projects
would not obtain funding in a world without hands-on lenders.
5 A decentralized economy
5.1 Preliminaries
In this section, I study the equilibrium provision of loans in a decentralized economy in which
hands-on and credit-score lenders compete. For the rest of the paper, I consider the cases for
which the cost of screening is k < k . As seen above, hands-on lending is strictly dominated
when the cost exceeds k. Therefore, there is no role for hands-on lending in that case.
The timing is as follows. First, each rm is endowed with a quality level , which is
privately observed by credit-score lenders. Then, conditional on , a score s is drawn from
f (j), which is observed by all lenders. Lenders compete in the third stage by simultaneously
o¤ering a loan at gross interest rate i 2 [1 + r; A] to rms, or may decide not to make any
o¤er. Firms take loans from the lender quoting the lowest rate. Finally, hands-on lenders
choose whether to issue a hands-on or a credit-score loan to rms which have accepted their
o¤ers. Firms with funds implement their projects and repay their loans if and only if these
are successful.
A credit-score loan granted to a rm with quality  at a rate i involves an opportunity
cost of 1 + r and an expected return of   i. Hence, a credit-score loan issued to a rm with
quality  generates a prot for the lender given by:
C (i; ) =   i  (1 + r) .
Potentially, both credit-score lenders and hands-on lenders can issue credit-score loans.
The latter do not observe the rms quality , but a score s. The expected prot of issuing
a credit-score loan to a rm with score s at rate i is given by:
C

i; s; h^

=
Z

C (i; )  h^ (js) d,
where h^ (js) is some (posterior) density over quality levels , conditional on the observation
of the score s. The function h^ (js) is an equilibrium object, as specied below.
On the other hand, the expected prot from a hands-on loan initiated with a rm with
quality  and granted at a rate i is given by:
R (i; ) =  k +   [i  (1 + r)] .
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The expected prot of a hands-on loan issued to a rm with score s at a a rate i is therefore
given by:
R

i; s; h^

=
Z

R (i; )  h^ (js) d.
For any given interest rate i, rms score s and conditional density h^ (js), we can compare
each lending mode and determine which one is the most protable. The expected prot
given by the most protable lending mode is:


i; s; h^

 max
n
R

i; s; h^

;C

i; s; h^
o
.
5.2 Strategies and equilibrium concept
Before describing the strategies and the equilibrium concept, it is useful to note that, for
any given rm with quality , and for any given interest rate i, the payo¤ di¤erence between
a credit-score and a hands-on loan
C (i; )  R (i; ) = k   (1  )  (1 + r)
is independent of the interest rate i.
Consequently, for any given score s, for any xed density function h^ (js), and for any
given interest rate i, it follows that the expected di¤erence in prots from a credit-score and
a hands-on loan
C

i; s; h^

  R

i; s; h^

=
Z

[k   (1  )  (1 + r)]  h^ (js) d.
is independent of the interest rate i.
The following remark is an immediate consequence of this property and is useful for
simplifying the description of strategies and the denition of an equilibrium:
Remark 1 For any given score s, and any xed density function h^ (js), whether issuing
a credit-score or a hands-on loan is more protable for a lender does not depend on the
particular interest rate i charged.
In equilibrium, the interest rate i charged on a loan to a rm with a score s does have an
inuence on the relative protability of each mode of lending, for it inuences the conditional
density h^ (js). Moreover, di¤erent type of loans may potentially (and will) be priced at
di¤erent interest rates in equilibrium. However, for a given xed density h^ (js), and any
given interest rate i, the relative protability of each lending mode does not (directly) depend
on the interest rate i.
Strategies for credit-score lenders are interest rates iC (s; ) to o¤er to a rm with score s
and quality . Hands-on lendersstrategies entail interest rates iR (s) to o¤er to a rm with
a credit score s, and a lending mode aR (s) credit-score or hands-onfor the last stage of
the game (although the choice of lending mode for the hands-on lender should potentially
depend on the equilibrium interest rates, it follows from Remark 1 that we can suppress the
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dependence of aR () on the interest rate). I adopt the convention i = +1 to denote that no
loan is o¤ered.
A symmetric Bayesian equilibrium of this game is a prolen
iC (s; ) ;
 
iR (s) ; aR (s)

; h^ (js)
o
of strategies, and beliefs h^ (js) for hands-on lenders, such that:
(i) Given hands-on lenders strategies
 
iR (s) ; aR (s)

and other credit-score lenders
strategies iC (s; ), for each potential borrowers (s; ), a credit-score lender strategy
iC (s; ) satises:
Either iC (s; ) 2
arg max
i2[1+r;A]
C (i; )
s:t: i  miniC (s; ) ; iR (s)	
C (i; )  0
9>>>>=>>>>;,
or iC (s; ) = +1.
A credit-score lendersequilibrium strategy iC (s; ) is a choice of interest rate that max-
imizes the expected prot C (i; ) from issuing a credit-score loan to a rm with quality 
and score s, provided that the interest rate does not exceed other o¤ers, and yields nonneg-
ative prots. If such interest rate does not exists in the space [1 + r; A] , then no o¤er is
made (i = +1).
(ii) Given credit-score lenders strategies iC (s; ), other hands-on lenders strategies 
iR (s) ; aR (s)

, and beliefs h^ (js), for each potential borrowers s, a hands-on lenders
strategy
 
iR (s) ; aR (s)

satises:
(ii.1) Given any interest rate i 2 [1 + r; A] o¤ered in the previous stage of the game, the
lending mode aR (s) solves:
aR (s) 2 arg max
a2fC;Rg
n
C

i; s; h^

;R

i; s; h^
o
.15
(ii.1) Given its own lending mode aR (s) 2 fC;Rg in the nal stage of the game, the
15By Remark 1, aR () is independent of i.
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interest rate iR (s) satises:
Either iR (s) 2
arg max
i2[1+r;A]


i; s; h^

s:t: i  miniC (s; ) ; iR (s)	


i; s; h^

 0.
9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
,
or iR (s) = +1.
A hands-on lendersequilibrium pricing strategy iR (s) is a choice of interest rate that
maximizes the expected prot 

i; s; h^

from issuing the most protable loan to a rm with
score s, provided that the interest rate does not exceed other o¤ers, and yields nonnegative
prots. If such interest rate does not exists in the space [1 + r; A] , then no o¤er is made
(i = +1).
(iii) Beliefs h^ (js) are derived from prior distributions and equilibrium strategies by
Bayesrule, whenever possible.
5.3 Decentralized equilibrium without credit-score lenders
Before analyzing the equilibrium of this game, the following proposition characterizes the
decentralized equilibrium in the absence of credit-score lenders. Recall that hands-on lenders
can (and will, in equilibrium) issue credit-score loans, that is, loans that are granted by the
hands-on lender without screening.
Proposition 2 Let L  kA (1+r) , M  1+rA and H  1+r k1+r , as dened in Proposition
1. Let iR (s) = k
s
+ (1 + r) and iC (s) = 1+r
s
. Then, the unique equilibrium allocation and
pricing of loans in the absence of credit-score lenders is given by:
a (s) =
8<:
No loans if s < L
hands-on loans at rate iR (s) if L  s < H
Credit-score loans at rate iC (s) if H  s
.
Proof. See appendix.
Lenders choose the loan type whose associated break-even interest rate is lower, and o¤er
the break-even rate on the chosen loan type. Otherwise, other hands-on lenders could charge
lower o¤ers. The higher the surplus generated by a loan, the lower the rate that a lender can
charge to a rm and break-even. Consequently, break-even rates are lower for, say, hands-on
loans, if and only if hands-on loans are more e¢ cient than credit-score loans.
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ACost of LoanforHands­on Lenders
Cost of Loan forCredit­Score Lenders
L M H
Eficiency NoLoans Screeening Credit Scores

  

 


 




 












Uchida, Udell and Yamori (forthcoming), using survey data on Japanese SMEs, show
that banks with local presence tend to concentrate their lending activities on soft information
acquired at its branches. Berger, Cowan, and Frame (2011) seem to conrm this nding. In
their study of the use of credit scores by American banks, they nd that most community
lending originates on soft information.
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium of this game.
Proposition 3 Let L  kA (1+r) , M  1+rA and H  1+r k1+r , as dened in Proposition 1.
Let iC ()  1+r

and iR (s)  k
s
+ (1 + r). Then, there exists a unique equilibrium, which
satises the following characteristics:
(i) There exists a threshold s > L such that:
a) iR (s) = +1, for all s < s.
b) iR (s) 2  iR (s) ; A, for all s 2 [s; 1).
c) iR (s) is continuous and strictly decreasing, with lims!1 iR (s) = 1+rH .
(ii) There exists a threshold  (s)  1+r
iR(s)
, dened in the range s  s, such that:
iC (s; ) =
8>>><>>>:
iC () if either s  s and    (s)
or s < s and   M
+1 otherwise
.
Proof. See appendix.
hands-on lenders charge a rate that decreases continuously with the public score s to rms
exceeding a certain public score threshold s. This threshold is above L, which is the lower
bound for hands-on loans in the absence of credit-score loans, as described in Proposition 2.
The rate iR (s) exceeds iR (s), the one that would be charged in the absence of credit-score
lenders. For rms with a public score above s, credit-score lenders issue loans to those for
which they can earn nonnegative prots by charging a rate below iR (s). Firms with public
scores below s and quality above M obtain credit-score loans.
In order to grasp some intuition for this result, Figure 3 illustrates the selection of rms
with a given score s. The horizontal axis displays rmsquality. The solid line represents
the break-even line for hands-on loans, while the dashed line represents the break-even
line for credit-score loans. For a given interest rate iR (s), credit-score lenders can charge
iC () < iR (s) to rms with quality  >  (s) and make nonnegative prots.
Formally, hands-on lendersexpected prots on a borrower with score s in equilibrium is
given by :
R

i; s; h^

=
Z

R (i; )  h^ (js) d,
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where h^ (js) denotes the (posterior) density of ~, conditional on s and    (s). Recall
that, in the absence of asymmetric information, hands-on lendersprot function is given
by:
R (i; s; g^) =
Z

R (i; )  g^ (js) d,
where g^ (js) denotes the (posterior) density of ~, conditional on s, derived from prior dis-
tributions by Bayes rule. For any borrower with score s 2 (0; 1), for any interest rate
i 2 [1 + r; A], we have that:
R

i; s; h^

< R (i; s; g^) ,
for the latter includes a strictly better pool of borrowers.
The presence of credit-score lenders with access to more accurate credit scores reduces
the value of hands-on lending, as reected by the last inequality. Since R (; ) is increasing
in the interest rate i, hands-on lenders must charge a rate iR (s) in excess of iR (s). Moreover,
the minimum public score s required to obtain hands-on loans must also exceed L.
6 Ine¢ ciency of the decentralized equilibrium
Recall from Proposition 1 that the constrained e¢ cient allocation of loans is given by:
a^ () =
8<:
No loans if  < L
hands-on loans if L   < H
Credit-score loans if H  
.
Figure 4 illustrates the equilibrium allocation of loans and contrasts it with the (con-
strained) e¢ cient allocation. The horizontal axis displays rms quality. The solid line
represents the break-even line for hands-on loans, while the dashed line represents the break-
even line for credit-score loans. The e¢ cient allocation, depicted in Figure 1, can also be
observed in this diagram. For  < L, the surplus created by a hands-on loan is negative.
In this graph, this fact can be mapped to the break-even rate for a hands-on loan to rms
 < L exceeding the maximum surplus A that a project can generate. For rms in the range
[L; H ], hands-on loans are more e¢ cient, which is reected in the hands-on loan break-even
rate laying below the credit-score line. For rms with quality  > H , the most e¢ cient form
of funding is a credit-score loan.
In equilibrium, rms with quality  > H obtain credit-score loans, which is e¢ cient.
However, some rms with quality  2 [M ; H ] get credit-score loans, while e¢ ciency pre-
scribes that they get hands-on loans. Also, some rms with quality  2 [L; M ] are de-
prived from funding, instead of obtaining hands-on loans. Finally, some rms with qualities
 2 [0; L] ine¢ ciently get hands-on loans.The following immediate result follows:
Proposition 4 The decentralized equilibrium is constrained ine¢ cient.
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We can identify two sources for this ine¢ ciency. First, the lower accuracy of the credit
score that hands-on lenders have access to leads to an incorrect ex-ante identication of the
rmsquality. The second originates on the distortion that credit-score lenders induce on the
equilibrium allocation. The wedge between iR (s) and iR (s) creates a niche for credit-score
lenders, who can poach rms in  2 [M ; H ] from hands-on lenders. Moreover, the reduction
in the value of hands-on lending leads to rms (s; ) 2 [L; s]  [L; M ] to be ine¢ ciently
deprived from credit.
Not surprisingly, a way to eliminate this ine¢ ciency would be to endow hands-on lenders
with the same amount of ex-ante information as credit-score lenders. The market equilibrium
would then be e¢ cient. In practice, this can be di¢ cult. Developing a reliable credit score
model requires a large amount of available data and a big x investment. While large
institutions can exploit their economies of scale to implement credit score lending, small
community banks are unlikely to pursue that path. However, di¤erent type of lenders could
integrate and exploit the complementarity of their lending technologies. The last wave of
mergers and acquisitions experienced by the banking sector may have led to an improved
e¢ ciency of loan allocations along these lines.
6.1 Interest rates
The rst implication of this model for loan pricing is described in the following statement.
Corollary 1 For any xed rms quality level, hands-on loans are priced at a lower rate
than credit-score loans. Moreover, hands-on loan rates exhibit higher price dispersion than
credit-score loan rates.
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Proof. See appendix.
For any given quality level , rms that obtain hands-on loans face cheaper rates than
those getting credit-score loans. These are rms of intermediate quality, for which hands-on
loans are more e¢ cient than credit-score loans and, consequently, can be issued at lower
rates. The higher pricing dispersion of hands-on loans is due to the dispersion of public
scores across rms with the same quality.
The fact that hands-on loans are associated with lower interest rates has been acknowl-
edged in the empirical literature. An early reference is Petersen and Rajan (1994) who,
using data from the NSSBF, nd a small but positive e¤ect of hands-ons in reducing the
price of credit to rms. This result is found to be stronger by Berger and Udell (1995), who
analyzed the same data, but concentrated on a subset of loans that better capture the extent
of hands-ons. Degryse and van Cayseele (2000), using Belgian data, also point out the same
link between hands-on loans and their rates. Berger, Frame and Miller (2005) provide direct
evidence that small business credit scoring is associated with higher average loan rates for
loans under $100,000.16
Cerqueiro, Degryse and Ongena (2011) identify the pattern that loan rates for seemingly
identical borrowers exhibit substantial dispersion. They attribute this dispersion to dis-
cretion(versus "rules") in the loan pricing process at banks: while credit-score loans rates
would be the outcome of a precise mapping from predicted rm quality to prices, hands-on
loan pricing would incorporate bank o¢ cersassessments, based in soft information acquired
through their interaction. An increased use of credit scoring methods should therefore be
reected in a diminished role of discretion over time, particularly for rms whose character-
istics posed a bigger challenge for credit-score lenders in the past. Consistent with this fact,
Cerqueiro, Degryse and Ongena (2011) identify that the role of discretion has diminished
with time for small and less transparent rms. In addition, no signicant temporal changes
in discretion is identied when attention is reduced to a subgroup of loans that are mainly
hands-on-driven, which suggests that the reduction in discretion with time might be driven
by the implementation of better credit-score lending technologies, as predicted in this model.
hands-on loans are associated with lower rates, conditional on the quality of a rm.
However, the "unconditional" statement might be reversed in markets with su¢ ciently high
concentration of rms with high quality.
Corollary 2 If the proportion of high quality rms in the market is su¢ ciently high, the
average rate of credit-score loans is lower than the average rate of hands-on loans.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 3 shows that rms with higher quality (  H) are better suited to obtain
credit-score loans. Moreover, these rms obtain loans at cheaper rates than lower quality
rms. Hence, in markets with a large share of high quality rms, average credit-score loan
rates would be lower.
Martinez-Peria and Mody (2004) look into data from Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico
and Peru and nd that foreign bank entrants charge lower rates than national banks, despite
16Most nancial institutions do not issue loans based only on credit scores above a certain threshold.
18
facing similar costs for their funds. This pattern suggests that foreign lenders, who tend
to lend on the basis of nancial statements, charge lower rates than domestic hands-on-
driven lenders because the pool of rms that they target has higher quality.17 This view
is reinforced by the fact that domestic banks do not respond to the increased competition
posed by foreign banks by reducing their loan rates, but by concentrating their lending on
niches of less-transparent rms.
Berger and Udell (1996) analyze data on 900000 loans from the Federal Reserves Survey
of Terms of Bank Lending to Business and Call Reports. They nd that large banks are
predicted to charge about 100 basis points less on loans issued to small business than small
community banks.18 Moreover, they infer that this e¤ect is driven by the higher share of
credit-score borrowers in the portfolio of large and complex lending institutions and the
higher average quality of these borrowers. This result should be taken cautiously though, as
this e¤ect may well be distorted by a preferential access to funds by large banks.
6.2 Firmsquality and default rates
As argued above, an immediate result follows from observation of Proposition 3:
Corollary 3 The average quality of rms that get credit-score loans is higher than that of
rms that obtain hands-on loans.
This is consistent with Berger and Udell (1996), who argue that rms that obtain loans
from credit-score lenders have better quality than those being funded by community banks,
a fact that was also pointed out by Petersen and Rajan (2002).
Moreover, Petersen and Rajan (2002) nd that the access of rms with lower intrinsic
quality to credit-score loans has increased with time, and argue that this pattern is associated
with technological advances in the credit scoring industry, which have lead to more e¢ cient
appraisals of the creditworthiness of potential borrowers. Comparing the results of Propo-
sition 2 and Proposition 3 can help understand this pattern. In a situation in which there
are no informational asymmetries, only the best rms obtain credit-score loans. However, in
the presence of informational asymmetries, some rms of lower quality, namely  2 [M ; H ]
also obtain loans from credit-score lenders.
The expansion of credit-score lending has led practitioners and researchers to raise con-
cerns about the soundness of this lending practice. In particular, it has been pointed out
that credit-score lenders may be granting loans to worse creditors, simply because they
could save on the cost of screening. For instance, Berger, Cowan, and Frame (2011) write:
"The primary motive for these [credit-score] banks is likely reduced underwriting costs. This
method may exacerbate informational opacity problems, yield less accurate credit terms,
and result in greater future credit losses, but may nevertheless be protable because of the
17Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001) explore date from Argentina and nd that foreign-owned institutions
experience di¢ culties extending loans to opaque small rms and, hence, they tend to concentrate their
small-rm lending to enterprises with relatively transparent data available in their nancial statements.
18There is ample evidence that large banks focus on credit-score loans, while small banks tend to specialize
on the issuance of relationship loans. For instance, Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein (2005) and
Cole, Goldberg and White (2004) provide evidence that large banks lend at a greater distance and interact
more impersonally with their borrowers.
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lower costs". This observation is formalized in this paper. Credit-score lenders rely on a
technology that estimates the likelihood of nonperforming loans at a lower cost than that of
hands-on lenders, but that yields less accurate assessments. An immediate consequence of
this fact is summarized in the following result19:
Corollary 4 The probability of default of credit-score loans is higher.
This pattern has been evidenced in recent studies assessing the impact of credit-score
lending on the performance of loans. Berger, Frame and Miller (2005) study a 1998 Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta survey on the use of credit scores and nd that banks that rely on
small business credit-scoring experience higher default ratios. DeYoung, Glennon and Nigro
(2008), on 1984-2001 data from the SBA lending program, also nds that credit scoring is
associated with a higher rate of nonperforming loans than hands-on lending. These studies
seem to conrm that credit score lending is associated with riskier loans and that their
comparative advantage relies on lower costs of creditworthiness assessments.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides a framework to study the e¤ects of credit scores on hands-on lending.
The revolution in the credit-score industry constitutes a source of potential improvement
on the provision of loans to rms. However, it threatens the competitiveness, and even the
survival, of traditional forms of hands-on lending that add value to the provision of loans in
certain segments of rms.
The paper identies the ine¢ ciency induced by the relative advantage that advancements
in the credit score industry confer to credit-score lenders. Competition from credit-score
lenders with access to accurate credit scores reduces the value of hands-on lending. As a
consequence, there is an ine¢ cient underprovision of hands-on loans, hands-on lenders charge
higher prices on their loans, and provide less credit to creditworthy projects.
The paper contributes to an emerging literature on credit-score lending to small rms.
The availability of new data sets, credit registers and surveys has been followed by a wave
of empirical research that attempts to address the impact of credit-scores on the price and
availability of credit for Small and Medium Enterprises. This paper provides a theoretical
account for some of the regularities found in this literature. In particular, the model predicts
that credit-score lenders attract the rms with the highest quality, that hands-on lenders
charge lower interest rates to rms of similar quality, that hands-on loans exhibit higher price
variability, and that credit-score lending is associated with a higher rate of nonperforming
loans. These predictions are consistent with the received empirical evidence.
19This result does not depend on the assumption that relationship lenders perfectly observe the quality
of the project that they grant funds for. It is robust to assuming that relationship lenders observe a noisy
signal of the projects type, as long as the signal is more accurate than the credit-score lendersscore and
the cost of acquiring this information is su¢ ciently low. To see why, observe that relationship lenders incur
a cost k > 0 in order to obtain this information. In equilibrium, a relationship lender will only spend these
resources if its ex-post information is strictly better than that of the credit-score lender. This higher ex-post
information about borrowers that get credit explains the lower default rates of relationship loans.
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A potential policy implication of this analysis is that lenders should tend to integration in
order to eliminate the distortion induced by credit-score lenders. Large banks could benet
from the economies of scale involved in the development of accurate credit-score models. But
also, by having local presence, they could benet from the relative advantage that hands-on
lenders possess over a certain range of rms.
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A Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
The functions wC () and wR () are strictly increasing a¢ ne functions. Since, by assumption,
k < 1 + r, it follows that they intersect at H 2 (0; 1). We also have wC (0) < wR (0) and
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wC (1) > wR (1). Hence, hands-on loans are more e¢ cient than credit-score loans if and only if
 < H . Moreover, the surplus generated by a hands-on loan is positive if and only if  > L.
For assessment costs k < k it follows that L < H . Hence, it is e¢ cient to grant hands-on
loans for L <  < H . Moreover, wC (H) > 0. Hence, for it is optimal to grant credit-score loans
for  > H . Finally, for  < L, it is optimal not to grant credit.
On the other hand, for assessment costs k  k, we have that either wR (s) < wC (s) or wR (s) < 0
(or both). Hence, hands-on loans are dominated by either credit-score loans or by inaction. Hence,
hands-on loans are ine¢ cient. Credit-score loans are optimal if and only if wC () > 0, that is, for
 > M .
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium with interest rates iC (s; ) and
iR (s) for credit-score lenders and hands-on lenders, respectively. Fix an arbitrary s0 and assume,
for the sake of contradiction, that a hands-on lender issues a credit-score loan at rate iR (s0).
Necessarily, we have that prots for the hands-on lender are zero, i.e. C

iR (s0) ; s0; h^

= 0. If
prots were positive, it could be undercut by another hands-on lender. Moreover, by individual
rationality prots cannot be negative. By the same token, we have that credit-score lendersprots
are zero, i.e. C
 
iC (s0; ) ; 

, for all . Now, consider the following strategy for a credit-score
lender:
{^C
 
s0; 

=

iR (s0) if   s0
+1 otherwise .
Hence, we have that 0 = C

iR (s0) ; s0; h^

< C
 
{^C (s0; ) ; 

, where the last inequality follows
from C (i; ) being strictly increasing on . Hence, there exists a protable deviation for the
credit-score lender.
Proof of Proposition 2. In the absence of credit-score lenders, beliefs are just given by the
posterior distribution of quality ~, given s, derived by Bayesrule as:
g^ (jx) = f (xj)  g ()R
 f (xjt)  g (t) dt
.
Dene C (i; s)  C (i; s; g^) and R (i; s)  R (i; s; g^). For a given i 2 [1 + r;A], since
C (i; ) (resp. R (i; )) is an a¢ ne function of , and f (xj) are continuous for all  2 , it
follows that C (i; s) (resp. R (i; s)) is an a¢ ne function of s. Moreover, for a given i, C (i; )
(resp. R (i; )) is strictly increasing in . Hence, since f (xj) satisfy the SMLRP, it follows that
C (i; s) (resp. R (i; s)) is strictly increasing too.
For any given i 2 [1 + r;A], we have that R (i; s) > (=)C (i; s) if an only if s < (=) H .
Hence, hands-on loans cannot be issued for rms with scores s > H , as by continuity of C (i; s)
on s, any such hands-on loan could be protably undercut by a credit-score loan. Moreover, for
s < L, it follows that R (i; s) < 0 for any i 2 [1 + r;A], the last inequality holding with equality
for s = L and i = A. Hence, hands-on loans granted to rms with such scores yield negative
prots. Let s 2 [L; H ] and dene the break-even rate iR (s) associated with a hands-on loan to a
rm with score s implicitly as R
 
iR (s) ; s

= 0. By strict monotonicity of R (; s) on s, it follows
that iR (s) is unique. Moreover, by denition of s, it follows that iR (s) = ks + (1 + r) (which lies
in [1 + r;A] for s 2 [L; H ]). For any given s , any loan with i (s) > iR (s) could be protably
undercut by some other hands-on loan. On the other hand, any loan with i (s) < iR (s) would lead
to losses.
Credit-score loans can only be issued if s  H , as by continuity of R (i; s) on s, any credit-
score loan issued for s < H could be protably undercut by a hands-on loan. Analogously as for
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hands-on loans, dene the break-even rate iC (s) associated with a hands-on loan to a rm with
score s implicitly as C
 
iC (s) ; s

= 0, which is given by iC (s) = 1+rs . Reasoning analogously as
above, this is the only possible equilibrium rate.
Let k  k. For any i 2 [0; 1], for all s, either R (i; s) < C (i; s) or R (i; s) < 0 (or both).
Hence, only credit-score loans can be issued in equilibrium. For s < M , it follows that C (i; s) < 0
for any i 2 [1 + r;A], the last inequality holding with equality for s = M and i = A. For s  M ,
any credit-score loan that both leads to nonnegative prots and cannot be undercut must be issued
at rate iC (s).
Proof of Proposition 3. Part (i):
Let  (i)  1+ri and dene:
R (i; s) =
Z (i)
0
R (i; )  h^R (js; i) d,
where h^R (js; i) denote the (posterior) density of , conditional on s and  <  (i).
Assume that the credit-score lender charges iC (s; ), as dened in the statement of the proposi-
tion. Then, iR (s) must be such that hands-on lendersexpected prot from establishing a hands-on
with a rm with score s and choosing an interest rate i is given by R (i; s).
First, it is shown that iR (s) = +1 for all s < s.
Since R (i; ) is continuous in  for all i 2 [1 + r;A], it follows that R (i; ) is continuous on s
for all i 2 [1 + r;A]. Moreover, we have that R (i; 0) < 0 for all i 2 [1 + r;A], which implies that
R (i; 0) < 0 for all i 2 [1 + r;A]. Hence, by continuity of R (i; ) on s, it follows that R (i; s) < 0
for all i 2 [1 + r;A], for some s > 0. Moreover, for any i 2 I, h (js; i) satises the SMLRP. Hence,
R (i; ) is strictly increasing on s for all i 2 I. Hence, it follows that R (i; s) < 0 for all s < s. It
remains to show that s > L. By denition of L, we have that R (i; L) = 0 for all i 2 [1 + r;A].
But also, we have that R (i; s) < R
 
i;  (i)

for all s < 1, all i 2 [1 + r;A]. Hence, R (i; s) < 0,
for all i 2 [1 + r;A].
Now, it is shown that iR (s) > iR (s).
First, observe that for any s < 1, we have that R (i; s) < R
 
i;  (i)

for all i 2 [1 + r;A].
But also, by construction of H , it follows that R
 
i;  (i)

< (=) 0 for all i < (=) 1+rH . Hence,
hands-on lenders must choose interest rates in the interval I 

(1+r)
H
; A
i
.
Fix s < 1. We show that if R (i; s) > 0 for some i , then there exists i (s), with 1+rH < i (s) < i,
such that R (i (s) ; s) = 0. As noted above, we have that R

1+r
H
; s

< 0. Hence, the result
follows immediately by continuity of R (; s) with respect to i.
We show now that the set S+  s : R (i; s)  0 for some i 2 I	 is non-empty. Observe that
lims!1 R (i; s) = R
 
i;  (i)

> 0 for any i 2 I. Hence, by continuity of R (i; ) with respect to
s for all i 2 I, it follows that there exists s < 1 such that R (i; s) > 0 for some i 2 I.
Dene s  minS+. By continuity of R (i; ) on s, it follows that S+ is left-closed. Hence, s
exists. Moreover, s coincides with the upper threshold dened in part (i).
Now, for each s < 1, dene the set I (s)  i : R (i; s) = 0 	 and let i (s)  min I (s). By
continuity of R (; s) on i for all s, it follows that I (s) is a closed set and hence the minimum
interest rate i (s) for which a hands-on lender breaks-even on a loan initiated with a borrower with
a credit score s exists.
Since hands-on lenders must break-even, it follows that iR (s) = i (s). Also, since R (i; s) >
R (i; s) for all i 2 I, all s < 1, it follows that iR (s) > iR (s), for the expected quality of the pool
of applicants is strictly lower.
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Finally, it is shown that iR () continuous and strictly decreasing, with lims!1 iR (s) = 1+rH .
We have that R (i; ) is strictly increasing on  for all i 2 I. Since R (i; ) is strictly increasing
on s for all i 2 I, we have that for any i 2 I (s), it follows that R (i; s00) > 0 for any s00 > s0. But
then, we have seen above that there exists i (s00), with 1+rH < i (s
00) < i, such that R (i (s00) ; s00) = 0.
Hence, i (s00)  i (s00) < i. Hence, iR strictly decreasing.
To show that iR is continuous, let iR (s) = max

R (i; s) : i 2 I (s)	, which trivially leads to
iR (s) = i (s). Then, continuity of iR follows from the Berges theorem of the maximum, for R (; )
continuous in its two arguments and I (s) compact-valued and continuous.
Finally, observe that lims!1 R (i; s) = R
 
i;  (i)

. Also, R
 
i;  (i)
  0. But also, by
construction of H , it follows that R
 
i;  (i)

< (=) 0 for all i < (=) 1+rH . Hence lims!1 i
R (s) =
1+r
H
.
Part (ii):
Since C (i; ) is continuous in  for all i 2 [1 + r;A] and f (xj) are continuous for all  2 ,
it follows that C (i; ) is continuous in  for all i 2 [1 + r;A]. Also, C (i; ) is strictly increasing
in , for all i 2 [1 + r;A]. Hence, C (i; ) is a strictly increasing function of . Let iR (s) be the
hands-on lendersstrategy and dene  (s)  1+r
iR(s)
, dened in the range s  s, as the score that
solves C
 
iR (s) ;  (s)

= 0. Let s  s, Then, for any given  <  (s), charging i < iR (s) leads
to losses. Hence, it is optimal for credit-score lenders to reject any such applicant. From strict
monotonicity of C (i; ) on , it follows that C  iR (s) ;  > 0 for any    (s). Hence, for each
   (s), there exists a range of interest rates i 2 iC () ; iR (s) for which credit-score lenders can
make nonnegative prots. Competition among credit-score lenders yields the desired result.
Now, let s < s. Then, the hands-on lender is passive and therefore credit-score lenders charge
iC () on the rms for which C (i; )  0, for some i 2 [1 + r;A]. By construction, M determined
the range of rms for which nonnegative prots can be earned.
Proof of Corollary 1. Fix a quality level  and let  (s) as dened in the above proposition.
Credit-score lenders charge iC () to all rms with scores s < 
 1
(). On the other hand, hands-on
lenders charge iR (s) to rms with higher scores s > 
 1
(). By construction of  (s), it follows
that iR (s) < iC () for all s > 
 1
(). Hence, credit-score lenders charge a higher rate to rms
of the same quality. Moreover, rms with the same quality obtain di¤erent interest rates iR (s)
at hands-on lenders, while rms obtaining credit at credit-score lenders get the same interest rate
iC ().
Proof of Corollary 2. Let iC and iR be the unconditional interest rate charged by credit-
score and hands-on lenders. Let H  1+r k1+r stand for the minimum quality for which credit-score
loans outperform hands-on loans and let   1   G () be the measure of rms with quality
higher than H . We can write the unconditional interest rate charged by credit-score lenders as
iC =   iCHighQual + (1  )  iCLowQual, where iCHighQual and iCLowQual stand for the average interest
rates of loans granted to rms with quality levels  > H and its complement, respectively. From
the characterization of the equilibrium, we know that iR (s) > 1+rH for all s, all . Hence,it follows
that iR > 1+rH . Also, we have that i
C () = 1+r and hence, i
C () < 1+rH for all  > H . Hence,
iCHighQual <
1+r
H
. Therefore, there exist  2 (0; 1) such that iC < iR.
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